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Abstract: This paper explores an account of conservativity based 
on copy theory of movement, based on suggestions in Chierchia 
(1995), Fox (2002), Ludlow (2002) and Sportiche (2005). In this 
approach, conservativity is not a constraint on the lexicon, but 
rather just a by‐product of the syntax‐semantics interface. The 
reason for the (apparent) absence of non‐conservative determiners 
from natural languages is that in entering chain relations in the 
syntax, they would lead to quantificational clauses truth‐ 
conditionally equivalent to ones created by regular conservative 
determiners. When these clauses have non‐trivial meanings (i.e., 
non‐contradictory and non‐tautological), then the relevant non‐ 
conservative determiner’s meaning might very well exist, but we 
cannot be sure as we could obtain the same sentence meaning with 
some conservative function instead. In other cases, the clauses 
created would have trivial meanings, and this would be the reason 
for their absence (Gajewski 2002). I then discuss three problems for 
this idea: (i) DPs in subject position, (ii) late merge and (iii) raising 
constructions (Hallman 2012). In response, I propose that (1) DPs 
always move and (2) every movement operation triggers a 
triviality check. I will then show that with these assumptions one 
can account for all of the three challenges above. 
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A standard way of thinking about the meaning of natural language determiners is as 
functions from sets to generalized quantifiers, type ۦۦe,tۧ,ۦet,tۧۧ. Given the enormous 
number of logically possible functions of this type (see discussion and proof in Keenan 
and Stavi 1986), one of the aims in the semantics literature, since the introduction of 
Generalized Quantifier Theory in linguistics, has been defining precisely the range and 
the properties of those functions that can serve as possible semantic denotations for 
determiner expressions (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Higginbotham and May 1981; Van 
Benthem 1983; Keenan and Stavi 1986; among many others).1 Among the properties 
individuated, ‘Conservativity’ is probably the most famous. Conservativity is a 
property of functions defined as follows: a function f is conservative if and only if the 
equivalence in (1) holds:  
 
(1) Conservativity = A function f is conservative iff for all A, B: 
 f(A)(B) = f(A)(A ∩ B)  
 
Sometimes, this property is illustrated by an informal natural language version of 
the equivalence in (1), given in (2a) and (2b).  
 
(2)  a. Every elephant is grey = Every elephant is a grey elephant. 
   b. Most linguists are friendly = Most linguists are friendly linguists.  
 
The observation that all English determiners exhibit this property has led Keenan 
and Stavi (1986) to the conjecture of the universal in (3).2 
 
(3) Conservativity  Universal: Extensional determiners in all languages are always 
interpreted by conservative functions.  
                                                 
1 For Generalized Quantifier Theory, see Mostowski (1957) and Lindstroem (1966). 
2 Barwise and Cooper (1981) have instead two stronger universals that entail this: 
(i) NP‐Quantifier Universal: Every natural language has syntactic constituents (called noun‐ phrases) 
whose semantic function is to express generalized quantifiers over the domain of discourse.  
(ii)  Determiner Universal: Every natural language contains basic expressions, (called determiners) whose 
semantic functions to assign to common count noun denotations (i.e., sets) A a quantifier that lives on A 
(Barwise and Cooper 1981:177). 
(See von Fintel and Matthewson (2008) for discussion of these two universals.)  
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(3) is a robust and accepted generalization, which has persisted through the 
years, despite putative counterexamples.3 To my knowledge, conservativity still does 
not have a satisfactory and complete explanation, though there are suggestions on how 
to derive it in the literature, to which I will not be able to do full justice here. Rather, in 
the following, I will instead explore an approach to conservitivity based on the syntax‐
semantics interface. In this approach, there is no direct ban on the denotation of 
determiners like (3) above. Rather, determiners are in principle free to denote 
conservative or non‐conservative functions. I will show, however, that in the latter 
case, given the way syntax and semantics interact, the meanings they give rise to are 
indistinguishable from the meanings one would obtain by corresponding conservative 
functions. Therefore, I argue, these non‐conservative denotations of determiners might 
very well exist, but we cannot be sure as the resulting sentence meaning we observe 
could also be obtained by using some corresponding conservative determiner meaning 
instead. Moreover, I discuss the situation in which the sentence meaning these 
hypothetical non‐conservative determiners would give rise to is trivial (i.e. 
contradictory or tautological). In this case, we can be sure these determiner meanings 
do not exist, precisely because they would lead to trivial meanings. In fact, this case is 
what lead Chierchia (1995), Fox (2002) and Sportiche (2005) to the proposal that there 
aren’t non‐conservative determiners precisely because they would always lead to 
trivial meanings.4 In this paper, I show that this original idea is not able to account for 
cases of hypothetical non‐conservative determiners, which do not lead to trivial 
sentence meanings and I will formulate a different proposal in terms of the equivalence 
mentioned above between sentence meanings involving hypothetical non‐conservative 
determiners and those involving conservative ones. The intuition by Chierchia (1995), 
Fox (2002) and Sportiche (2005) will play a role in an indirect way, however, for those 
cases in which a hypothetical non‐conservative determiner would lead to a sentence 
meaning that is trivial.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, I show that the initial 
formulations of the structural account of conservativity (Chierchia 1995; Fox 2002; 
Sportiche 2005) are not sufficient, in that they are unable to cover the case of potential 
                                                 
3 See Ahn and Sauerland (forthcoming) for a recent interesting case with proportional quantifiers in 
German and Korean.  
4 Here “triviality” is used as a general term including both contradictions and tautologies. In section 6 
below, I will introduce the more stringent notion of Logical‐triviality, by Gajewski (2002). Notice that Fox 
(2002) does not talk about ‘trivial’ meanings, because he uses a theory of chains in which copies are  
transformed in presuppositional elements and therefore the relevant corresponding notion is that of 
systematic ‘presupposition failure.’ As far as I can see, nothing changes if we adopt his system for our 
purposes here. See also footnote 27.  
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non‐conservative meanings of determiners, which lead to non‐trivial meanings for the 
quantificational clause they are in. Then, I show how a modified version of this 
approach can handle this case too. Finally, I discuss three problems for the structural 
hypothesis and I propose a solution for each. In particular, the paper is organized as 
follows: in the rest of the introduction, I will outline the proposal in brief and discuss 
some general motivations for a structural approach to conservativity. In section 2, I will 
outline the basic hypothesis. In section 3, I will discuss the case of non‐conservative 
meanings for determiners, which do not lead to triviality. This latter case is the reason 
for modifying the original basic hypothesis. In section 4, I will discuss three problems 
for the basic hypothesis, having to do with DPs in subject position, late merge of 
adjuncts, and the case of raising constructions observed by Hallman (2012). In section 
5, I will propose to supplement the basic idea with the assumptions that DPs always 
move from a VP‐internal position and that every movement triggers a triviality check 
and show how these assumptions allow us to solve the three problems above. Finally, 
in section 6, I will explore some notions of triviality that one could assume in 
conjunction with the account of conservativity proposed in this paper. In section 7, I 
will conclude the paper.  
Before moving on to discussing some initial motivations for a structural 
approach to conservativity, let me state more precisely the generalization related to 
conservativity to be accounted for, in relation to the assumptions we will be making 
about the way determiners compose with their arguments, and the proposal that I will 
put forward in the paper below.5 
 
1.1. The Generalization and the Proposal in a Nutshell 
Notice that (3) is a generalization about the possible denotations of determiners. There 
is, however, a related generalization about sentence meanings involving determiners, 
which we could formulate as in (4). 
 
(4) Conservativity  Universal  (sentence  level):  In all languages, every sentence 
involving an extensional determiner of the form “D NP VP” is always equivalent 
to a sentence of the form “D NP is an NP that VP”. 
 
Under the assumption that a sentence of the form “D NP VP” is simply 
interpreted as [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]]), the generalization in (4) is straightforwardly related 
to the one in (3). In the structural approach explored here, however, we make diﬀerent 
assumptions about the way a sentence of the form “D NP VP” is composed. In essence, 
                                                 
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this extremely helpful discussion here.  
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given the interaction between syntax and semantics we assume, sentences like those 
are composed as [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]) (where the first argument of the “D” is 
also interpreted in the second argument) .As a consequence, the two generalizations in 
(3) and (4) are not related anymore in a straightforward way and the one we should be 
aiming to account for is (4) rather than (3). 
In the following, I will first discuss the hypothesis by Chierchia and Fox to 
account for (4) as in (5).  
 
(5) Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis: If the meaning of a sentence of the form “D NP VP” is 
computed via the recipe [[D]] ([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]) then whenever [[D]] is a non‐
conservative function such a sentence will always have a trivial meaning.  
 
Then, I will show that (5) is not suﬃcient to account for (4). This is because it is 
simply not true that all sentence meanings created in that way given some non‐
conservative [[D]] are trivial. I will therefore propose instead to replace (5) with (6).  
 
(6) Structural Conservativity: If the meaning of a sentence of the form “D NP VP” is 
computed via the recipe [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]), then whenever [[D]] is a non‐
conservative function such a sentence will always be equivalent to 
f([[NP]])([[VP]])for some function f that is conservative.  
 
Notice that (6) doesn’t make reference to triviality. Triviality, however, still plays 
an indirect role ‐ in a way vindicating the original intuition of the Chierchia‐Fox 
hypothesis. This is because in those cases in which the sentence meanings created 
would be trivial, assuming triviality is blocked, we can be sure that those hypothetical 
non‐conservative determiners do not exist. In addition, (6) will also allow us to explain 
those cases in which the sentence meanings created are instead not trivial. 
 
1.2. Motivating the Structural Route to Conservativity 
In this section, I discuss how the link between conservativity and the syntactic category 
of determiners strongly suggests that an account of conservativity in which syntax 
plays a prominent role should be pursued.  
1.2.1. Processing and Semantic Approaches to Conservativity 
To my knowledge, a full‐fledged pragmatic/processing account has not been proposed, 
but one might hope that a simple principle like (7) could account for conservativity. 
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(7) In quantificational statements, consider only the members of the denotation of the 
first argument of the quantifier.6 
 
A different approach is to encode the constraint in the semantics. Keenan and 
Stavi (1986) have proven that conservative determiners are exactly the ones obtained 
by closing a small class of initial determiners under boolean operations (see also Van 
Benthem 1983 for a similar proof). The Conservativity Theorem, as they call it, shows that 
the set of determiners generated from the relations of every (inclusion: D (A) (B) = A  B) 
and the one of some  (overlap: D  (A) (B) = A ∩ B ≠ ) using boolean compounds and 
adjectival restrictions, coincides with the one of conservative determiners. From their 
result they speculate that it could be the reason for the existence of conservativity itself:  
our definition of DDet [determiners] together with the CT [conservativity theorem] gives a 
reason why the possible det denotations of English are just the conservative functions. 
Namely, that fact follows from the fact that DDet  must be closed under the boolean 
operations and contain certain simple functions we need to interpret simple dets 
(Keenan and Stavi 1986:291).    
So conservativity would follow from the fact that conservative functions are the 
only denotations that we can generate given the basic ingredients that we have.  
1.2.2. Conservativity and Determinerhood  
Notice that in both approaches above, no connection is predicted between the possible 
denotations of determiners, what they call determiners, and actual determiner 
expressions. That is to say, there is nothing in the processing/pragmatic or semantic 
approach that link the conservativity constraint on functions from sets to generalized 
quantifiers to the syntactic category of determiners. In other words, one prediction of 
both accounts above is that conservativity should be a general constraint on 
quantification and that there should not exist non‐conservative functions in the lexicon 
regardless of the syntactic category to which they would be mapped. In other words, it 
is not expected that a processing or a general semantic constraint should be able to 
discriminate between syntactic categories. I think this is the main motivation for 
exploring a more structural account of conservativity, in which the syntax plays a 
crucial role together with the semantics.  
In relation to the connection between conservativity and determinerhood the case 
of only is interesting. I will not be able to explore the semantics of only in the context of 
                                                 
6 Here ‘first’ needs to be understood in terms of what argument is encountered first in the bottom‐up 
semantic composition, rather than on linear order. For a suggestion along these lines, see Chierchia (2009), 
who uses this notion of ‘coming first in the semantic composition’ to account for data regarding 
presupposition projection. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point.  
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the copy theory of movement in any detail, but one simple possible approach would be 
to analyze it as a non‐conservative function:7 
 
(8) [[Only]] = λPλQ[P  Q] 
 
To see that (8) is not conservative consider the non‐equivalence in (9). 
(9) Only students smoke. ≠ only students are students who smoke. 
  
The left hand‐side is contingent, while the right hand‐side is tautological. So only 
is a potential counterexample to conservativity and the usual response is to claim that 
only is not a determiner hence conservativity would not apply. But this means precisely 
considering conservativity not as a constraint on quantification in general but as 
quantification mapped to the syntactic category of determiners. However, then, as 
mentioned above, it is not clear why a processing‐based account should distinguish 
between quantificational elements that belong to different syntactic categories: why 
adverbial quantification would be allowed to be less efficient from a processing point 
of view than determiner quantification? Similarly, why a general semantic constraint 
should distinguish between a quantifier mapped to the category of determiners and 
one mapped to the one of adverbs? As Hackl (2000:29) puts it: 
Since it [only] is an adverbial quantifier that is non‐conservative, the conservativity 
universal seems to be (primarily) a property of determiner quantifiers and not a 
property of quantification in natural language per  se. This prompts immediately the 
question why only determiner quantifiers are universally conservative and suggests to 
look for an answer in terms of the syntactic properties of determiner quantifiers. 
Another example is the (English) comparative morpheme −er, which has been 
analyzed as a quantifier over degrees. Both the variant with larger cardinality and the 
one with proper subset are non‐conservative.8 
 
(10) [[er]] = 
        a. λPۦd,tۧλQۦd,tۧ[max(Q) > max(P)]         
        b. λPۦd,tۧλQۦd,tۧ[P Q]               
  
                                                 
7 Where P would correspond to the restrictor and Q  to the scope (e.g., in the case of only2, students and 
smoke respectively). For a treatment of only within the copy theory of movement, see Erlewine (2014).  
8 See Beck (2011) for a summary and references and Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) for an analysis that 
crucially involves the non‐conservativity of −er. 
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Again this would be a case of a non‐conservative quantifier mapped to a category 
that is not the one of determiners. Evidently, both these cases depend on the semantics 
one adopts for only and for the comparative morpheme, but if we want to allow the 
possibility of these kinds of analyses, then a pragmatic or a purely semantic route to 
conservativity does not seem to be the right choice. So, I think, then, it is worth 
exploring a more structural account, which encodes conservativity not in the lexicon 
but more in the syntax/semantics interface and which can account for the connection of 





In the structural account of conservativity that I will propose here, conservativity is not 
a direct constraint on the lexicon, rather it is a by‐product of the syntax/semantics 
interface. This approach is suggested in Chierchia (1995), Fox (2002), Ludlow (2002) 
and Sportiche (2005) and it is based on the assumption that there are contentful traces 
in the syntax.9 The gist of the idea is in (11), repeated from above:  
  
(11) Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis: If the meaning of a sentence of the form “D NP VP” is 
computed via the recipe [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]) then whenever [[D]] is a 
non‐conservative function such a sentence will always have a trivial meaning.  
 
Below I will discuss how this basic hypothesis will need to be modified. But first I 
turn to discuss some assumptions on the semantics of chains.  
 
2.1. Some Assumptions on the Interpretation of Chains  
In the following, I will assume a syntax‐semantics mapping that is based on a level of 
syntactic structure (Logical Form) interpreted by the semantic component where the 
scope of quantifiers can be determined by movement operations (see Heim and Kratzer 
1998, Jacobson 2002 and Fox 2003 for discussions of the arguments and comparison 
with alternative approaches). I will also crucially assume the copy theory of movement 
(Chomsky 1993, 1995) in which movement transformations are conceptualized just as a 
copying operation followed by phonological deletion. Copy theory has the advantages 
                                                 
9 Ludlow (2002) proposes a syntactic version of Keenan and Stavi’s (1986) idea that determiners are 
composed (in the syntax) as simple determiners and boolean operations. This is not a feature of the 
proposal I am defending in this paper and it potentially leads to very different predictions. I leave a 
detailed comparison with Ludlow’s (2002) idea for future work.  
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of eliminating traces and making movement a simpler operation, as Fox (2003:44) 
remarks:                                                              
Chomsky (1995) points out that the copy theory of movement simplifies syntax in two 
ways. First, the theory eliminates the need to postulate new objects (traces) beyond run‐
of‐the‐mill lexical items. In this sense, it brings us closer to a view of syntax as a 
recursive procedure that does not access anything but the lexicon. Second, the copy 
theory turns movement into a simpler operation; it is practically identical to the 
elementary structure‐building operation (merge), differing only in that it takes as input 
an object that has served as input for an earlier merger (move is re‐merge).  
More importantly for us here, it opens new perspectives on how chains should be 
interpreted. Once one assumes copy theory of movement, hence having constructions 
such as (12) one must entertain some mechanism for altering lower copies to make 
them interpretable with the rules above.  
 
(12) [DP Every movie] [ 1 [TP Polanski [VP likes [DP ۦevery movieۧ1]]]]    
 
In a framework with traces it was natural to interpret the trace of the moved item 
as a bare variable (Heim and Kratzer 1998) and one could also stipulate that this is 
what happens to copies too, but there are more interesting options and this is what we 
will exploit here.  
For the sake of the discussion, I will make some simplifications concerning the 
semantics of chains, but nothing hinges on these assumptions. The proposal here is 
compatible with a class of semantics of chains, as long as somehow the NP part of the 
copies is interpreted at the tail and at the head of the chain (see Sauerland 1998; Fox 
2002; Sportiche 2005; among many others).  
For a sentence like (13), I will not go into the internal composition of the VP and I 
will just assume the meaning for the entire VP as in (14), which then composes with the 
moved DPs as in (15).10 
 
(13)  Polanski likes every movie.  
 
                                                 
10 One way to think about this is to have the copy of the first argument of the quantifier and the verb 
combining in such a way that the former ‘restricts’ the latter (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). In this way, 
λyλx[likes(x,y)] and λv[movie(v)] would become λyλx[likes(x,y)  movie(y)]. Then, one could assume that the 
result combines with the individual assigned to the index, which is later abstracted on, thereby becoming 
λx[likes(x, g(1))  movie(g(1))]. For similar composition mode, see Geenhoven 2002. Again, none of the 
points below hinges on any of these particular assumptions about the semantics of chains. 
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(14)  [[likes ۦevery movieۧ]]g = λz[likes(z,[[1]]g)  movie([[1]]g)] 
 
(15)                                 
       
                    DP                            λx[likes(p,[[1]]g[x/1])  movie([[1]]g[x/1])] 
     every           movie 
                                         1                                            TP 
                                                               likes(p,[[1]]g)  movie([[1]]g)           
 
                            
                                                    DP                                        VP 
                                                      p                      λz[likes(z,[[1]]g)  movie([[1]]g)] 
 
 
                                               Polanski                     likes ۦevery movieۧ1 
 
The meaning of the whole sentence could be paraphrased as something like 
‘everything that is a movie is liked by Polanski and it is a movie.’ Which we can 
represent in predicate logic or in set notation as in (16a) and (16b) respectively.  
 
(16)  a.x[movie(x) → (likes(p,x)  movie(x))] 
         b. {x : x is a movie}  {{y : y is liked by Polanski} ∩ {z : z is a movie}}  
 
2.2. Predictions for Non‐Conservative Determiners 
The Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis is that if non‐conservative determiners existed, in 
entering chain relations, they would lead to trivial meanings. In order to test this 
hypothesis, consider some made‐up non‐conservative determiners defined on the 
complement of the restrictors, let us call them everynon, somenon  and nonon, the 
denotations of which are given in (17), (18) and (19).11, 12 
                                                 
11 The former is used in Chierchia and McConnell‐Ginet (2000), see also von Fintel (1994). Notice that these 
are not those cases of lexicalization gaps of the ‘south east corner’ of the square of oppositions for 
connectives and quantifiers as observed in Horn (1972) and Horn (1989). The case of the universal 
quantifier is usually called not all and has the definition in (i), which is perfectly conservative as shown by 
the equivalence in (ii):  
(i) [[everynon]] = λPλQ ¬x[P(x) →Q(x)] = 
 λPλQ[{P∩Q−} ≠  ]  
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(17)  [[everynon]] = λPλQ[P−  Q] = 
         λPλQx[¬P(x) → Q(x)]  
         = λPλQx[P(x)  Q(x)]  
 
(18)  [[somenon]] = λPλQ[(P− ∩ Q) ≠ ] = 
         λPλQx[¬P(x)  Q(x)]  
 
(19)  [[nonon]] = λPλQ[(P− ∩ Q) = ] = 
        λPλQ¬x[¬P(x)  Q(x)]  
 
To illustrate these possible determiners at work, consider a sentence like (20) and 
a possible LF of it in (21), where the DP [everynon movie] has moved from its object 
position.  
 
(20) Polanski likes everynon movie.         
 
(21) [everynon movie] [λi [Polanski [likes ۦeverynon movieۧ]i]]]  
 
As is evident from the informal paraphrases given below, if we apply these 
meanings to the sentence above, the result is contradictory. The same result is obtained 
if we replace everynon with somenon. We obtain a tautological meaning if we replace it 
with nonon, as shown in (24a).  
 
(22)  a. x[¬movie(x) → (likes(p,x)  movie(x))] 
         b. {x : x is not a movie}  {{y : polanski likes y} ∩ {z : z is a movie}}  
         c. For everything x that is not a movie, Polanski like x and x is a movie. 
                                                                                                                                               
(ii) {P ∩ Q−} =  = P ∩ {P ∩ Q−} =       
For an explanation based on the notion of generalized scalar implicatures and markedness of 
negation see Horn’s work cited above (see also Levinson 2000). For a recent different interesting proposal 
within a system where logical operators are based on min and max operators see Katzir and Singh (2013). 
It is not clear to me whether there is a relation between the absence of lexicalization of operators of this 
sort and non‐conservative ones and I will leave this topic for future research. 
12 For any set A, A− is the complement of A, that is the domain D − A. Also, whenever possible I will give 
the meaning of quantifiers in predicate logic.  
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(23)  a. x [¬movie(x)  (likes(p,x)  movie(x))]  
  b. {x : x is not a movie} ∩ {{y : Polanski likes y} ∩ {z : z is a movie}} ≠  
  c. There exists an x that is not a movie and Polanski likes x and x is a movie.  
 
(24)  a. ¬x [¬movie(x)  (likes (p,x)  movie(x))]  
  b. {x : x is not a movie} ∩ {{y : Polanski likes y} ∩ {z : z is a movie}} =  
         c. It is not the case that there exists an x that is not a movie and Polanski likes and 
x is a movie. 
  
As we will see a similar result is obtained also for other made‐up non‐
conservative determiners. From now on, I will use a more schematic way to present the 
relevant cases. First, let us define a symbol څ, which given a function f  and its 
arguments (A, B) has the following effect.13 
 
(25)  f څ (A,B) = f (A,A ∩ B)  
 
Abstractly, the relationship between the syntax and the semantics of chain is as 
follows: the syntax creates a structure in which the (internal argument of the) 
determiner phrase has a copy in the second argument of the determiner. In the 
semantics, the effect of this syntactic operation is that the first argument of the 
quantifier is also interpreted within its second argument. In turn, this leads to the effect 
that if the determiner had as lexical denotation a non‐conservative function, the 
resulting sentence would wind up with a trivial meaning.14 For instance, everynon 
would be presented as in (26), where in (26a) there is the lexical meaning of the 
determiner and in (26b) the output given the syntax‐semantics assumed here.  
 
(26)  a. [[everynon]] = λPλQ[P−  Q] 
         b. [[everynon]]  څ (A, B) = A−  (A ∩ B)  
 
                                                 
13 Contrast this operation with the more commonly used operation of semantic composition, which we 
could call $ and that works as in (i). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this notation to me.  
(i) f $ (A,B) = f (A,B)  
 
14 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point. See below for a refinement of this point: 
the resulting sentence is not always trivial, but it could also be equivalent to a sentence one can also obtain 
by assuming a conservative function as the lexical meaning of the relevant determiner.  
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Similar cases of possible non‐conservative determiners include the proper subset 
relation, which is non‐conservative and which here would lead to quantificational 
clauses that are always false.  
 
(27)  a. [[propsub]] = λPλQ [P  Q] 
         b. [[propsub]]  څ (A,B) = A  (A ∩ B) 
  
Also the (non‐conservative) superset or equal relation leads to a trivial (always 
true) meaning.15 
 
(28) a. [[superseteq]] = λPλQ[P  Q]  
        b. [[superseteq]] څ (A,B) = A  (A ∩ B)  
 
Summing up, what we have seen so far are cases of possible non‐conservative 
denotations of determiners, which create trivial meanings if put in a chain with copies. 
Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis is that this is precisely the reason why we do not see these 
denotations in natural language. I turn now to the case of some possible non‐
conservative denotations which, surprisingly, do not lead to trivial meanings and, 
therefore, requires us to modify Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis. I will also show that the 
resulting sentences are equivalent to what you would obtain if we were to assume for 
the lexical meaning of the relevant determiner a conservative function, instead. I will 
argue, therefore, that these contingent non‐conservative lexical denotations for 
determiners might very well exist in the lexicon of certain languages and will modify 






                                                 
15 Notice that, as mentioned above, only  has been sometimes given the meaning of a non‐conservative 
determiner encoding the superset or equal relation as in (i) (see De Mey 1996; among others). The case of 
only goes beyond the scope of this paper, and in the literature there are various arguments against the idea 
of treating it as a determiner with the analysis in (i) (see von Fintel 1999 and Ippolito 2007; among others 
for discussion). Here let me just point out that regardless of the analysis of only  the superset or equal 
relation is a potential non‐conservative determiner and it is predicted to lead to a trivial meaning given the 
Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis:  
(i) [[Only]] = λPλQ[P   Q]   
     λPλQ׊x[Q(x) → P(x)]  





Recall that the prediction of the Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis for non‐conservative 
determiners is that they should always lead to triviality. So what we don’t expect is to 
assign a non‐conservative function as the denotation of a determiner and to find that 
the resulting sentence when it combines with its arguments A,B  has a non‐trivial 
meaning, even when its B arguments contains a copy of its A argument. But let me 
show you now that, in fact, we do find such cases. Consider the relation of larger 
cardinality, call the corresponding potential non conservative determiner ‘Korgat’.16 
 
(29)  a. [[Korgat]] = λPλQ[|P| > |Q|]  
         b. [[Korgat]] څ (A,B) = |A| > |A ∩ B| 
 
It is straightforward to show that [[Korgat]] is contingent.  
i. If A  B is true: 
   a. then (A ∩ B) becomes simply A hence  
   b. |A|>|A ∩ B| becomes |A|>|A| which is false  
 
ii. If A ⊈ B:  
  then (A ∩ B) is either  or some non‐empty proper subset of A itself.  
i. in the first case |A| > |A ∩ B| becomes |A| > 0 which is true, if we assume 
that non‐emptiness of the domain of quantification is provided 
independently.  
ii. in the second case |A| > |A ∩ B| becomes true, given that in this last case 
A ∩ B can only be a subset of A.  
                                                 
16 I will give monster names to these non‐conservative functions. To see that ‘Korgat’ is non‐conservative 
consider the following situation: imagine |A| = 5 and |B| = 10 and that |A ∩B| = 0. In this situation, (ia) is 
false but (ib) is true:  
(i)  a. [[Korgat]](A,B) = 5 > 10 = false  
      b. [[Korgat]](A,A ∩ B) = 5 > 0 = true  
Therefore, the ‘conservativity equivalence,’ repeated in (ii), does not hold.  
(ii) Conservativity = def 
    A function f is conservative iff for all A,B  E 
    fE (A)(B) ⇔ fE (A)(A ∩ B)   
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iii. Hence we have cases in which [[Korgat]] is true and cases in which it is false, 
showing that it is contingent. 
  
Also the identity relation in (30), let us call it [[Minulzur]], gives rise to the same 
issue. As shown below, [[Minulzur]] is also contingent.  
 
(30)  a. [[Minulzur]] = λPλQ[|P| = |Q|] 
         b. [[Minulzur]] څ (A, B) = |A| = |(A ∩ B)|  
i. if A  B is true 
   a. then (A ∩ B) becomes simply A hence 
   b. |A|=|A ∩ B| becomes |A|=|A| which is always true 
ii. if A ⊈ B    
 a. then (A ∩ B) is either  or some non‐empty proper subset of A itself. 
 b. in both cases |A| = |A ∩ B|, which is false, provided again an independent    
                   condition that prevents emptyness of the domain of quantification. 
iii. So, also for [[Milnuzur]] we have contingency 
 
Similarly, consider [Zeesnook], which relates two sets with identity directly, or 
[Sakalthor], which is the superset relation. As the reader can verify, they both lead to 
contingent meanings (the latter for instance is always true, unless A  B, then A  (A ∩ B) 
becomes A  A).  
(31)  a. [[Zeesnook]] = λPλQ[P = Q]  
         b. [[Zeesnook]] څ (A, B) = A = (A ∩ B) 
  
(32)  a. [[Sakalthor]] = λPλQ [P  Q]  
         b. [[Sakalthor]] څ (A, B) = A  (A ∩ B)  
 
Other minor variations, lead to contingency, like [[Balkumagan]] expressing the 
the first set is empty or [[Glusterhap]] relating the two cardinalities of the arguments to 
the same number:  
 
(33)  a. [[Balkumagan]] = λPλQ[P ∪ Q = Q]  
         b. [[Balkumagan]] څ (A,B) = A ∪ (A ∩ B) = (A ∩ B) 
             A = (A ∩ B) 
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(34)  a. [[Glusterhap]] = λPλQ [|P| = 3  |Q| = 3  
         b. [[Glusterhap]] څ (A,B) = |A| = 3  |(A ∩ B)| = 3  
 
Summing up, the cases we have just seen are all cases of potential lexical 
denotations of determiner expressions that are non‐conservative but that do not lead to 
sentences with trivial meanings. These cases are therefore problematic for the 
Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis.  
If we look at the meanings above, however, it turns out that the truth‐conditions 
of all of them correspond to the ones that conservative lexical denotations of 
determiners give rise to. In particular, the cases considered either correspond to the 
meaning of sentences created by every or not every or expressions like the three. Where 
every is defined as in (35), not every as in (36) and a numeral like the three is defined as in 
(37) (Keenan 1996; among others).  
 
(35)  [[every]] = λPλQ[P  Q]  
 
(36)  [[not every]] = λPλQ[P ⊈ Q]  
 
(37)  [[the three]] = λPλQ[P  Q  |P ∩ Q| = 3]  
 
For instance, [[korgat]], once fed the appropriate argument, is equivalent to not 
every: always true, unless A  B, as in (38). Similarly, [[Minulzur]](A,B) is only true 
when (A ∩ B) = A and this is so when A  B. Therefore, it is equivalent to every. The 
same goes for Zeesnook, Sakalthor and Balkumagan. 
 
(38)  [[korgat]] څ (A,B) = |A| > |A ∩ B| =  
         (A ⊈ B) 
 
(39)  [[Minulzur]] څ (A,B) = |A| = |(A ∩ B)|  
         (A  B)  
 
(40)  [[Zeesnook]] څ (A,B) = A = (A ∩ B) = 
         A  B  
 
(41)  [[Sakalthor]] څ (A,B) = A  (A ∩ B) = 
         (A ⊈ B)  
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(42)  [[Balkumagan]] څ (A,B) = A ∪ (A ∩ B) = (A ∩ B)  
         A = (A ∩ B) = (A  B)  
 
As for the case of the identity related to a number, it ends up being identical to 
the meaning of an expression like the three, defined above.  
 
(43) [[Glusterhap]] څ (A,B) = |A| = 3  |(A ∩ B)| = 3  
        (A  B  |A|=3)  
 
The idea, therefore, is that these non‐conservative determiner meanings above 
should not be excluded after all. In fact, as far as we can tell, they could just be the 
meaning of every or not every or of numeral determiners like the three. In other words 
we could not distinguish them from the meaning generally assumed for every, (i.e. 
λPλQ[P  Q]) and that we could assign to not every (i.e. λPλQ[P ⊈ Q]).17   
Summing up, we have seen that the Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis is challenged by 
the case of contingent sentences containing non‐conservative determiners. However, 
we have also seen that these contingent meanings can also be obtained by using 
regular conservative determiners. Therefore, we cannot exclude in this case that these 
non‐conservative determiners exist. In other words, I propose to reformulate 
Chierchia‐Fox hypothesis as in (44). It is not the case that if non‐conservative 
determiners existed, they would always lead to triviality but rather if non‐conservative 
determiners existed, they would either lead to triviality or to meanings that are 
equivalent to the ones obtained by some conservative determiners.18 
 
(44) Structural Conservativity (first version): If the meaning of a sentence of the form 
“D NP VP” is computed via the recipe [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]), then 
whenever [[D]] is a non‐conservative function such a sentence will either be trivial 
or equivalent to f ([[NP]])([[VP]]) for some function f that is conservative.  
 
As an anonymous reviewer suggested to me, we could even simplify (44) as in 
(45). This is because, even for the cases above of non‐conservative functions leading to 
a trivial meaning, we can always find a corresponding conservative function that 
would lead to such a meaning.  
 
                                                 
17 Notice that not every is assumed not to be lexicalized in any language, see Horn (1989), Katzir and Singh 
(2013) and footnote 11 above. 
18 Thanks to Rick Nouwen (pers. comm.) for suggesting to me this way of looking at the issue here.  
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(45) Structural Conservativity  (second version): If the meaning of a sentence of the 
form “D NP VP” is computed via the recipe [[D]]([[NP]])([[VP]] ∩ [[NP]]), then 
whenever [[D]] is a non‐conservative function such a sentence will always be 
equivalent to f([[NP]])([[VP]]) for some function f that is conservative.  
 
Consider for instance the case of everynon  in (46a), repeated from above: once it 
combines with its arguments in the way seen above, it gives rise to the meaning in (46b).  
 
(46)  a. [[everynon]] = λPλQ[P−  Q] 
         b. [[everynon]] څ (A,B)=A−  (A∩B)  
 
As it turns out, however, also in this case we can define a corresponding 
conservative determiner, call it everynon’, which would give rise to the same meaning 
in (46b), as shown in (47b). Basically, what is happening in (47) is that we are defining 
the function in such a way that its first argument is intersected with the second 
argument in the second part of the output of the function (A  ∩ B). This effectively 
mimics semantically what the syntax/semantics of chains assumed above does by 
leaving an interpreted copy at the bottom of the chain. When the two effects are 
combined, as in (47b), the result is equivalent to (46b). However, the difference is that 
everynon’ in (47a), unlike everynon in (46a), is a conservative function.19 Therefore, there 
is a conservative function which leads to the same result we obtain by using the non‐
conservative function in (48a). The recipe is very general and extends to all other cases 
considered above like somenon and nonon. 
  
(47)  a. [[everynon’]] = λPλQ[P−  (P ∩ Q)] 
         b. [[everynon’]] څ (A,B) = A−  (A ∩ A ∩ B) = 
             A−  (A ∩ B)  
 
So what is the difference between cases like everynon, somenon, on one hand, and 
cases like Minulzur, on the other? In a sense, there is no difference: as we saw, in both 
cases we can find a corresponding conservative function, which leads to the same 
sentence meaning. This is why we can adopt the simplified version of Structural 
Conservativity hypothesis in (45).  
                                                 
19 To see that everynon’ is conservative consider the equivalence in (i): 
(i) [[everynon’]]$(A, B) = A− ك (A ∩B) = A− ك (A ∩A ∩B) = [[everynon’]]$(A, A ∩ B)  
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There is, however, also a difference between the two cases of course, which one 
could see as vindicating the intuition in Chierchia (1995), Fox (2002), Sportiche (2005): 
cases like everynon  (and everynon’) lead to trivial quantificational sentences. This, I 
argue, is the reason why they are not possible denotations of determiners in natural 
language, regardless of their being conservative or not – provided triviality is blocked 
independently, as we will discuss below. Cases like Minulzur  (and its corresponding 
conservative counterpart every), on the other hand, lead to contingent meanings. In this 
case, I argue, either of them could exist as the lexical denotation of the determiner 
‘every’ in English (and its counterpart in other languages). I will come back in the last 
section on which notion of triviality we could assume in conjunction with the 
structural hypothesis of conservativity proposed here. In the following, I will turn to 
three problems for this hypothesis, arising in particular with those hypothetical 
determiner meanings that lead to triviliaty, and will propose a response to these 
problems based on two independently motivated assumptions about DPs and the 






The first problem is constituted by DPs in subject position. The problem is that in this 
position, DPs can be interpreted in situ, because, unlike DPs in other positions, they do 
not give rise to a type mismatch (Heim and Kratzer 1998). If this is the case, though, 
they would not create pointless or logically trivial meanings, as it is evident from the 
example below. 
 
(48)  a. Everynon student smokes 
         b. x [¬student(x) → smoke(x)] 
  
This is, of course, a consequence of the fact that the meanings of these non‐ 
conservative determiners are not trivial by themselves, but become trivial only under 
the particular transformation that the syntax‐semantics assumed here leads to. In other 
words, if this transformation doesn’t occur, the meanings are perfectly contingent, 
hence we are back to the situation in which it is not obvious why the determiner 








Another problematic prediction is made under some particular assumptions that allow 
late merge after Quantifier Raising (QR), which goes back to Lebeaux (1990) and have 
been used among other things in accounts of adjunct‐extraposition from NP (Fox and 
Nissenbaum 1999) and Antecedent Contain Deletion (Fox 2002). The problem is that 
we could create a case like (49), where we first QR the non conservative DP everynon 
movie and then we late merge the relative clause that is Italian.20 
 
(49) Polanski likes everynon movie that is Italian.  
 
(50)                                                                               TP 
                                                                                                       DP 
                                                          TP                     λi       D                     NP 
                                           DP                  VP               everynon            movie 
                                                                                                  
                                     Polanski    V                   DPi 
                                                     likes       D                  NP  
                                                               everynon         movie 
 
(51)                                                                               TP 
                                                                                                       DP 
                                                         TP                      λi       D                       NP 
                                           DP                  VP            everynon      movie     CP 
                                                                                                  
                                  Polanski       V                  DPi          that is Italian 
                                                    likes        D                 NP  
                                                           everynon         movie 
                                                 
20 Notice that in the tree below, I am following Fox and Nissenbaum’s assumption that QR is a rightward 
movement, but nothing relevant for us hinges on this assumption.  
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If we run the semantic computation on the LF thereby created, the output turns 
out to be non‐trivial (something that we could paraphrase as: ‘for every thing that is 
not an Italian movie, Polanski likes it and it is a movie’).  
 
(52) x[¬(movie(x)  italian(x)) → (likes(p,x)  movie(x))] 
 
4.3. Raising Constructions  
Hallman (2012) discusses a further interesting problematic case for the Chierchia‐Fox 
hypothesis, coming from raising constructions involving verbs like seem. To illustrate 
the problem, consider the case in (53): here one of the non‐conservative determiners 
that we discussed above is raised from the sentential argument of seem.21 
 
(53) Somenon unicorn seems to be in the garden.  
 
The problem with (53) is as follows: if we analyze (53) as in (54), the resulting 
meaning would be not trivial anymore. This is because the lower copy is interpreted in 
the scope of seem, while the higher one is interpreted outside. The resulting meaning 
would be something like (55), paraphrasable as there is some actual non‐unicorn, who 
seems to be a unicorn in the garden; a meaning that is obviously contingent.  
 
(54) [Somenon unicorn] λi seems [ۦsomenon unicornsۧi to be in the garden]  
 
(55) x [¬[[unicorn]]w(x)  w’ ∈ SEEMw (w’)[[[unicorn]]w’(x)  [[in‐the‐garden]]w’(x)]]  
 
Abstractly, the case noted by Hallman (2012) is one in which an operator ‘sits’ in 
between the lower and higher copies of a determiner phrase and appears to break the 
crucial link between the syntax of movement and the effect on the meaning of the 
resulting sentence. In other words, it is a counterexample to the hypothesis presented 
above that every time a determiner phrase is moved and a copy is left behind, the 
resulting structure would have a trivial meaning if the determiner was assigned a 




                                                 
21 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for bringing this problem and Hallman’s (2012) paper to my 
attention.  






I think the three problems above teach us that we should supplement the hypothesis 
above with two additional assumptions, both arguably independently justifiable.  
 
(56)  a. DPs always move from a VP internal position. 
         b. The result of every QR movement is checked for triviality by the semantic           
              component. 
  
The first assumption is motivated in the literature independently. Depending on 
the initial position of the DP in question, the reason for its movement could be for type‐
mismatch (Heim and Kratzer 1998) or for the VP‐internal subject hypothesis (Kratzer 
1996; among many others). So even basic sentences like (57a) or (57b) would have LFs 
like (58a) and (58b), respectively, in which the DPs always move from within the VP.  
 
(57)  a. Somenon students smoke. 
         b. Polanski met somenon students. 
 
(58)  a. [somenon students] λi [V P ۦsomenon studentsۧi smoke]                    
         b. [somenon students] λi[Polanski] λj [VP ۦPolanskiۧj met ۦsomenon studentsۧi]  
The second assumption is in line with the literature on economy conditions on 
scope‐shifting operations (quantifier raising or quantifier lowering) (Fox 2000; Mayr 
and Spector 2013; among others). The idea in that literature is that the output of every 
scope‐shifting operation is checked by the semantic component. The relevant property 
checked is whether the resulting meaning after movement is weaker than (or at least 
different from) the meaning of the sentence without movement. I think it is very 
natural to assume that the semantic component would check at each of these steps also 
whether the resulting meaning after movement is contradictory or tautological.22 In the 
next section, I go back to the three problems above and I show that they are not 
problems anymore given the two assumptions in (56). 
  
                                                 
22 Thanks to Danny Fox (pers. comm) for pointing this out to me.  
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5.2. Back to the Problems  
Consider again the problem of DPs in subject position, like (59). Above we noticed that 
the problem was that if the subject doesn’t undergo movement, the resulting meaning 
would not be trivial and thus a non‐conservative determiner should be allowed after 
all, albeit restricted to subject positions.  
 
(59) Somenon students smoke.  
 
Obviously, once we assume that DPs always move from a VP‐internal position, 
regardless of whether they are objects or subjects, we immediately solve this problem 
here. This is because, as seen above, a sentence like (59) would have the LF in (60), 
which does lead to the contradictory meaning in (61).  
 
(60)  [somenon students] [VP ۦstudentsۧ smokes]           
            
(61)  x [¬student(x)  (student(x)  smoke(x))]  
 
Going back to late merge, instead, we can see that the assumption in (56b) leads 
us to predict that the output of QR before late merge is checked for triviality by the 
semantic component. This means that the structure that is checked is (62), repeated 
from above, which again leads to the trivial meaning in (63).  
 
(62)                                                                              TP 
                                                                                                       DP 
                                                         TP                      λi       D                     NP 
                                           DP                  VP                everynon          movie 
                                                                                                  
                                   Polanski      V                   DPi 
                                                     likes       D                  NP  
                                                           ۦeverynon         movieۧ 
 
(63) x[¬movie(x) → (likes(p,x)  movie(x))]                   
Finally, Hallman’s (2012) problem with raising constructions like (64) can be 
solved by the combination of assumption (56a) and (56b).  
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(64) Somenon unicorns seems to be in the garden.  
 
First, given assumption (56a), the LF of the sentential argument of seem in (64) is 
(65). This is after the first movement from the VP internal position, before the DP 
further moves out the verb seems. Given the assumption in (56b) that the result of every 
movement operation is checked by the semantic component, now (65) would be 
checked for triviality.23        
                                  
(65) [somenon unicorns] to be ۦsomenon unicornsۧ in the garden. 
 
(65), of course, leads to the trivial meaning in (66), as we know. Therefore, 
sentences like (65) are not a problem anymore.24 
 
(66) x [¬unicorns(x)  (unicorns(x)  in‐the‐garden(x))]  
In sum, once we assume that there is always an initial movement of DPs from 
within the VP and that every QR operation triggers a triviality check, we are able to 
block Hallman’s problematic case at the embedded level, so to speak. Before closing, let 
me briefly consider an alternative solution to the raising problem, discussed by 
Hallman (2012) himself. The idea, following Sportiche (2005), is that copies should be 
interpreted with respect to the same world. This is actually the most natural 
assumption if we move to an approach in which predicates are interpreted with respect 
to world‐indices in the syntax (Percus 2000; among many others). In that case, a 
sentence like (64) could be given the representation in (66).25 As he discusses, this 
would lead to the trivial meaning in (67), as this would be saying that there is an‐actual 
non‐unicorn that for all worlds in the modal base of seems, it is an actual unicorn and is 
in the garden. 
 
(67) [somenon unicorns]w seems λw’ ۦsomenon unicornswۧ to be in the gardenw’ 
 
(68) x [¬unicornw(x)  w’ ∈ SEEMw(w’)[unicornw(x)  in‐the‐gardenw’(x)]]  
                                                 
23 A further assumption here is that the structure is build bottom up and some movement operations can 
happen before the whole sentence is constructed.  
24 Hallman (2012) discusses a similar solution to the one proposed here, but says that he knows of no 
motivation for the initial movement. I argue that the motivation comes from hypothesis like the VP 
internal subject hypothesis.  
25 Here I am not representing an extra lower copy within the VP, as it is not necessary for this solution.  
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Therefore, independently from the assumptions above in (56), there is an 
alternative plausible solution to the problem raised by Hallman’s (2012) case.26, 27 
                                                 
26 Notice also that in a system with world‐indices, the De Re reading Hallman is after doesn’t require 
interpreting the DP above seem and therefore we could have the LF in (i) where the DP is reconstructed in 
an embedded position. Nothing would change with respect to the point above.  
(i) seems λw’ [[somenon unicorns]w] to be in the gardenw’]  
(ii) w’ ∈ SEEMw(w’)[x[¬unicornw(x)  (unicornw(x)   in‐the‐gardenw’(x))]]  
27 Another option which Hallman (2012) discusses is based on Fox’s (2002) way of interpreting copies. 
Fox’s (2002) idea is called ‘trace conversion’ and is an operation that transforms the determiner in the 
lower copy into a definite determiner and have it bound by the quantifier in the higher copy. For instance, 
a sentence like (i), repeated from above, would have the LF in (ii).  
(i) Polanski likes every movie.  
(ii) [DP Every movie] [ 1 [TP Polanski [XP likes [DP the movie y   y = 1]]]]  
The idea Hallman (2012) discusses is that once we have a silent definite description in the structure, 
we might be introducing presuppositions associated to it, which could then help us in accounting for his 
problematic case. In particular, we could be introducing an existence presupposition about the NP‐
argument of the definite description. To illustrate, consider Hallman’s sentence again, which would now 
have the representation in (iii).  
(iii) [somenon unicorn]x seems to be [the y unicorns(y)   y = x in the garden(y)] 
The existence presupposition we could have here is that there is at least one unicorn. Moreover, as 
Hallman (2012) discusses, this presupposition appears to project through verbs like seems  in the case of 
overt definite descriptions, as shown by examples like (iv), which does presuppose that there exists an 
actual unicorn.  
(iv) It seems that the unicorn is in the garden. 
Therefore, if the silent definite in the lower copy has the same presuppositions as its overt counterpart, we 
would expect the following meaning: there is an actual unicorn x and x is actually not a unicorn (and x 
seems to be in the garden). In other words, we would have a contradiction again, once we consider the 
presupposition and the assertion together.  
Hallman dismisses this explanation because he claims that the presuppositions of the silent definite 
description of copies cannot be the same as that of overt definites, based on cases like (v), analysed as in 
(vi).  
(v) No unicorn will be on exhibit at the state fair this year.  
(vi) [No unicorn]x will be [the unicorn y   y = x] and on exhibit at the state fair this year  
The claim is that if an existence presupposition of the lower copy were to project out, (v) would 
have the contradictory meaning that ‘that no unicorn will be the unique real‐world unicorn on exhibit at 
the state fair this year.’ Given that (v) is clearly not contradictory, Hallman concludes that the 
presupposition of silent definite descriptions is different from those of their overt counterpart. 
I do not think the argument about (v) is correct: what Hallman overlooks in the case of (v) is that 
the presupposition of the lower copy is bound by the quantifier in the higher copy. Therefore, the 





In this section, I briefly discuss some options on how to implement the notion of 
triviality. As we saw, in a subset of the cases above, we needed the assumption that 
trivial meanings are banned. A constraint that excludes trivial meanings and triviality 
as ungrammaticality have been adopted in different linguistic domains (see among 
others, Barwise and Cooper 1981; Chierchia 1984, 2013; Gajewski 2002; Fox and Hackl 
2007). One general issue for these proposals is how to distinguish these trivial 
meanings from other (at least apparent) contradictions and tautologies that are 
grammatical, like (69) and (70) for instance (Fox and Hackl 2007).  
 
(69)  War is war.  
 
(70)  He’s an idiot and he isn’t.  
 
I think there are at least two options: one is based on the observation that natural 
language does not seem to lexicalize completely pointless words. Consider as an 
analogy a word like dax that would mean ‘it is both true and false.’ It is reasonable to 
think that this is not attested cross‐linguistically as a word, though it is conceivable that 
it could be lexicalized and it would be understood with no difficulties. So one idea 
would be that non‐conservative determiners are pointless in the same way, and one 
piece of evidence in favor of this route is that one can introduce artificially non‐
conservative determiners in the language, as I did in this paper, and they seem 
                                                                                                                                               
projection behavior that we should expect is not that of a non‐bound presupposition like (vii) but rather 
that of a bound presupposition like (viii).  
(vii) No student of mine met the dean today.  
(viii) No student of mine brought his iPad today. 
Now the projection behavior of bound presuppositions under ‘no’ is controversial (see Chemla 
2009 and references therein for discussion), but we would expect either an existential or a universal 
projection over the domain of quantification, not projection out. In other words, for (vii) the 
presupposition is either that some of my students have an iPad or that all of my students do, depending 
on the theory of presupposition projection one assumes. Similarly, for (v) we expect the presupposition to 
be that some individual in the domain of quantification is a unicorn or that every individual in that 
domain is. While it is not trivial to analyze (v) in detail (presumably the domain of quantification of no in 
(v) is over non‐existent entities in the first place) ‐ the point is that the presupposition would not be the 
problematic one that Hallman assumes. But then there is no reason to believe that the silent definite 
determiner of copies should not have the same presuppositions of their overt counterparts, and therefore 
the explanation above might become another alternative viable solution for the raising problem. I leave 
exploring the details of this alternative route for future research.  
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understandable and usable in a different way than other expressions that are more 
clearly ungrammatical. For the purposes here an intuitive constraint against the 
lexicalization of pointless expressions might be enough. It is not obvious, however, 
how to implement the idea of local triviality checking under this approach.28 
A second option is, instead, to adopt a more technical notion of triviality, linked 
to ungrammaticality (Gajewski 2002; see also Chierchia 2013). As mentioned above, the 
task for this kind of approach is to define a relevant subset of the trivial sentences and 
link that subset to ungrammaticality. Gajewski (2002) proposes to adopt an algorithm 
that takes LF structures and transform them by substituting all the non‐logical 
constants with variables with different indices. The output obtained is checked by a 
semantic system in order to see whether it is trivial. If this system can compute 
triviality at that level, then the sentence is logically‐trivial (always true/false only in 
virtue of its logical structure) and it is ungrammatical. That is, the hypothesis by 
Gajewski (2002) is that in (71).  
 
(71) Logically‐trivial meanings are ungrammatical.  
 
The relevant question here is whether trivial outputs of sentences containing 
non‐conservative determiners are logically trivial in Gajewski’s sense.  
 
(72)  Polanski likes everynon movies.  
 
(73)  [everynon movie] [λ1 [Polanski like [everynon movie]1]  
 
The logical constant in this sentence is everynon. Crucially, we have to add an 
assumption about substitution of copies: I will assume that they are substituted in the 
logical skeleton by the same variable.  
 
(74) [everynon NP1,<e,t>] [λi [DP2,e VP3,<e,<e,t>> NP1,<e,t>]  
 
In this case the sentence would be indeed L‐trivial as under every assignment g, 
each instance of g(NP1,<e,t>) will always be the same. That is the system would be able to 
detect the triviality from the logical skeleton alone.  
 
(75) z[¬P1,<e,t>(z) → (R3,<e,<e,t>>(x2,e,z)  P1,<e,t>(z))]  
                                                 
28 Thanks to Noam Chomsky (pers. comm) and Ede Zimmermann (pers. comm) for independently 
pointing out this to me. Thanks to Noam Chomsky also for the example of ‘it is both true and false.’  
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So Gajewski’s (2002) account and the assumption that copies are substituted at 





In this paper, I have developed and explored an account of conservativity based on the 
copy theory of movement following suggestions in Chierchia (1995), Fox (2002), 
Ludlow (2002) and Sportiche (2005). The basic idea, which I called the Chierchia‐Fox 
hypothesis, is that non‐conservative determiners would not exist because they would 
always lead to trivial meanings. I have discussed how this is not sufficient to account 
for the cases of non‐conservative determiners that do not lead to triviality and 
proposed to modify the basic idea, based on the observation that the resulting 
sentences we obtain with these hypothetical determiners are equivalent to those we 
would obtain by using some other corresponding conservative determiner meanings.  
In general, therefore, we cannot be sure whether non‐conservative determiners exist 
because in this syntactic‐semantic system they would lead to meanings that are 
equivalent to ones obtained by corresponding conservative determiners. In addition, in 
a subset of these cases the meanings obtained would be trivial. For these cases, we can 
be sure that these hypothetical denotations are not possible – provided triviality is 
blocked independently. I have also discussed the problems posed by subject DPs, late 
merge, and raising constructions, and I have proposed to deal with them by assuming 
that DPs always move from a VP‐internal position and that every movement operation 






Ahn, Dorothy, and Uli Sauerland. forthcoming. Reverse quantification with proportional quantifiers. In 
Proceedings of NELS 45, MITWPL.  
Barwise, John, and Robin Cooper. 1981. Generalized quantifiers and natural language. Linguistics  and 
Philosophy 4:159–219.  
Beck, Sigrid. 2011. Comparison  constructions. In Semantics:  An  international  handbook  of  natural  language 
meaning, Bd. 2, ed. by Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger and Paul Portner, 1341–1389.  
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.  
Bhatt, Rajesh, and Roumyana Pancheva. 2004. Late merger of degree clauses. Linguistic Inquiry 35(1):1–46.  
Chemla, Emmanuel. 2009. Presuppositions of quantified sentences: Experimental data. Natural Language 
Semantics 17(4):299–340.  
56  J. Romoli 
 
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1984. Topics in the syntax and semantics of infinitives and gerunds. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.  
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1995. Lecture notes. Utrecht.  
Chierchia, Gennaro. 2009. On the explanatory power of dynamic semantics. Talk presented at Sinn und 
Bedeutung 14, Vienna. 
Chierchia, Gennaro. 2013. Logic in grammar: Polarity, free choice, and intervention. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Chierchia, Gennaro, and Sally McConnell‐Ginet. 2000. Meaning and grammar: An  introduction  to semantics 
(2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1993. A minimalist program for linguistic theory. In The view from Building 20, ed. by Ken 
Hale and Samuel J. Keyser, 1–52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chung, Sandra, and William A. Ladusaw. 2004. Restriction and saturation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
De Mey, Sjaak. 1996. Generalized quantifier theory and the semantics of focus. In Quantifiers, Logic  and 
Language, ed. by Jaap van der Does and Jan van Eijck, 269279. Stanford: CSLI publications. 
Erlewine, Michael Yoshitaka. 2014. Movement out of focus. Doctoral dissertation, MIT. 
von Fintel, Kai. 1994. Restrictions on quantifier domains. Doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst. 
von Fintel, Kai. 1999. Counterfactuals in dynamic contexts. In MIT Working  Papers  in  Linguistics:  The 
interpretive tract, ed. by Uli Sauerland and Orin Percus, 123–152.  
von Fintel, Kai, and Lisa Matthewson. 2008. Universals in semantics. The Linguistic Review 25(1‐2):139201. 
Fox, Danny. 2000. Economy and semantic interpretation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fox, Danny. 2002. Antecedent‐contained deletion and the copy theory of movement. Linguistic  Inquiry 
33(1):63–96. 
Fox, Danny. 2003. On logical form. In Minimalist  syntax, ed. by Randall Hendrick, 82–123. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Fox, Danny, and Martin Hackl. 2007. The universal density of measurement. Linguistics  and Philosophy 
29:537586. 
Fox, Danny, and Jon Nissenbaum. 1999. Extraposition and scope: A case for overt QR. In Proceedings of the 
west coast conference on formal linguistics 18, ed. by Sonya Bird, Andrew Carnie, Jason D. Haugen 
and Peter Norquest, 132–144. Somerville, Massachusetts: Cascadilla Press. 
Gajewski, Jon. 2002. L‐analycity in natural language. Unpublished manuscript, MIT . 
Geenhoven, Veerle van. 2002. Raised possessors and noun incorporation in West Greenlandic. Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 20(4):759–821. 
Hackl, Martin. 2000. Comparative quantifiers. Doctoral dissertation, MIT. 
Hallman, Peter. 2012. Prospects for a syntactic analysis of conservativity. In UCLA Working  Papers  in 
Linguistics 17:103–108. 
Heim, Irene, and Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in generative grammar. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Higginbotham, James, and Robert May. 1981. Questions, quantifiers and crossing. The Linguistic Review 
1:4180.  
Horn, Lawrence. 1972. On the semantic properties of logical operators in English. Doctoral dissertation, 
UCLA. 
Horn, Lawrence. 1989. A natural history of negation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ippolito, Michela. 2007. On the meaning of some focus‐sensitive particles. Natural  Language  Semantics 
15(1):134. 
Jacobson, Pauline. 2002. The (dis)organization of the grammar: 25 years. Linguistics  and  Philosophy 
25(56):601–626. 
A structural account of conservativity              57 
 
 
Katzir, Roni, and Raj Singh. 2013. Constraints on the lexicalization of logical operator. Linguistics  and 
Philosophy 36(1):129. 
Keenan, Edward L. 1996. The semantics of determiners. In The handbook of contemporary semantic theory, ed. 
by Shalom Lappin. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Keenan, Edward L., and Jonathan Stavi. 1986. A semantic characterization of natural language 
determiners. Linguistics and Philosophy 9:253–326. 
Kratzer, Angelika. 1996. Severing the external argument from its verb. In Phrase structure and the lexicon, ed. 
by Johan Rooryck and Laurie Zaring, 109–137. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Lebeaux, David. 1990. Relative clauses, licensing, and the nature of the derivation. In Proceedings  of  the 
North  East  Linguistic  Society  20, ed. by Juli Carter, Dechaine Rose‐Marie, Bill Philip and Tim 
Sherer, 318–332. University of Massachusetts at Amherst: Graduate Linguistic Student 
Association. 
Levinson, Stephen. 2000. Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lindstroem, P. 1966. First order logic with generalized quantifiers. Theoria 32:187195. 
Ludlow, Peter. 2002. LF and natural logic. In Logical form and language, ed. by Gerhard Preyer and Georg 
Peter, 132–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mayr, Clemens, and Benjamin Spector. 2013. Not too strong! Generalizing scope economy. Ms, ZAS and 
ENS. 
Mostowski, Andrzej. 1957. On a generalization of quantifiers. Fundamenta Mathematicae 44(1):1236. 
Percus, Orin. 2000. Constraints on some other variables in syntax. Natural Language Semantics 8(3):173–229. 
Sauerland, Uli. 1998. The meaning of chains. Doctoral dissertation, MIT. 
Sportiche, Dominique. 2005. Division of labor between Merge and Move: Strict locality of selection and 
apparent reconstruction paradoxes. Unpublished manuscript, UCLA. 




Romoli, Jacopo. 2015. A structural account of conservativity. Semantics‐Syntax Interface 2(1):28–57. 
